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THE EURO,I NTEREST RATES
AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
GROWTH
In the euro area, long-term interest rates have con-
verged considerably since mid-1995. In May 1995 the
interest rate gap between Italy and Germany was 6.3
percentage points; between Spain and Germany the
gap was a good 5 percentage points in April of the
same year.Today the maximum difference (Portugal)
is no more than 0.4 percentage points. Even for
Greece, which will join the euro-area on 1 January
2001, the interest rate gap to Germany has been
reduced from 6 percentage points in March 1998 to
0.8 percentage points. During this entire period, the
interest rates in the Netherlands and Austria have
been practically identical to those in Germany.
Even though long-term interest rates have risen by
about 1.5 percentage points since January 1999,
most of the eleven euro countries are currently
enjoying unusually low rates since the risk premia
that international investors demanded have disap-
peared. As a result, real investment demand is
expected to revive. Without doubt, the countries
that have been liberated from the risk premia will
enjoy dynamic economic growth in coming years.
The growth of investment demand will probably
drive interest rates higher than had been custom-
ary in Germany, Holland and Austria. In this
respect, these countries could face more difficult
years ahead.
It is often maintained that the convergence of
long-term interest rates is primarily attributable to
the budget consolidation in countries with poor
budgetary performance in the
past. Figure 2 shows that the
facts do not substantiate this
interpretation. Countries like
France and Finland, which have
always met the EU debt crite-
ria, or countries like Spain and
Portugal, that have only fallen
slightly short, experienced the
same convergence of interest
rates as Italy and Belgium
which – despite considerable
consolidation – still have very
high debt levels. Evidently the
general interest-rate conver-
gence in the years up to 1998
was independent of the debt
levels of the countries involved.
The reduction of risk premia
had very little to do with the
growing solidity of national
budgetary policies.
The real explanation of the
decline in risk premia lies in the
constant reduction of the ex-
change rate risks as the deadline
for the final establishment of
currency parities approached.
Today the exchange rate risk
has disappeared entirely, and
only the country-specific bank-
ruptcy risks remain. Investors
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risks as particularly serious, however, as the closely
converged interest rates show.
For the European economy, the interest rate con-
vergence will bring a considerable boost to growth
because available savings will now no longer be pre-
vented by uncertain exchange rates from flowing
into the most profitable uses. Growth in European
productive capacity, which results from a given
investment volume, will reach its maximum extent
when the marginal return of real capital of different
countries is brought into equilibrium, and precisely
this can be expected,apart from the distorting influ-
ence of national taxation systems,when the terms of
financing are the same everywhere. The following
figure illustrates this argument.
The diagram,which is based on alternative scenarios
that pertain to Europe in 2010, shows the distribu-
tion of a given amount of investment capital to the
previous low interest-rate group consisting of
Germany,the Netherlands and Austria,as well as the
other eight euro countries that formerly had to pay
risk premia. The capital demand of these eight euro
countries is measured from left to right, the capital
demand of the three other countries from right to
left. The associated curves mark the corresponding
values of the marginal productivity of capital and,
because firms invest to the point at which the mar-
ginal productivity corresponds to the interest rate,
also the demand curve for capital.Without the intro-
duction of the euro, the risk premia would have
remained, and a capital market equilibrium would
have arisen to the left of the intersection point of the
marginal productivity curves at which the interest
rates of the countries would have differed by the risk
premium AC. With the introduction of the euro, the
risk premium disappears, however, and the interest
rates converge at the level of i*, which implies an
increase in the German, Dutch and Austrian interest
rates and a decline of the rates of the eight other
euro countries.To the extent of DE, capital that oth-
erwise would have been invested in Germany,
Holland and Austria is diverted to the other coun-
tries. GDP in these countries is therefore higher by
the area ABED, and GDP in Germany, Holland and
Austria is lower by the area
CBED than would have been
the case without the euro. On
balance, therefore, the intro-
duction of the euro increases
total European GDP by the
triangle ABC.1 This explains
the boost to growth. The fact
that Germany, Holland and
Austria have lost the financing
privileges that they enjoyed as
a result of the D-Mark or
exchange rates fixed to the D-
Mark may be regrettable,but it
is the reason for the expected
surge in growth in Europe as a
whole. H.-W.S./R.K.
MPCGANL Marginal productivity of capital in Germany, Austria and the
Netherlands
MPCEuro-8 Marginal productivity of capital in the other eight euro countries
i GANL Interest rates in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands if the euro
hadn’t been introduced
i Euro-8 Interest rates in the other euro countries if the euro hadn’t been
introduced
i* Uniform interest rate in all euro countries after the introduction of
the euro
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1 As the Balassa Effect implies higher
national inflation rates in most of the
countries that previously had to pay
higher interest rates, it can also be
argued that the low real interest rates
in these countries are the reason for
the high capital demand. This is the
same argument though,since,when rel-
ative prices change, a welfare optimum
is defined by the international equality
of the overall rates of return to capital
where these rates are defined as the
sums of the marginal value products
and the rates of national price increase.
If the national rates of price increase
differ, the curves denoted MPC must
be interpreted in terms of these overall
rates of return.